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Highlights 
 Bayesian-LOPA is proposed for use as risk analysis tool for SGCS 
 Beyesian logic was used to update SGCS failure frequency data for LOPA application 
 The tool provided a  better and more reialable method for modelling event scenerios 
 A better judgement can then be made in the application of SIS for a required SIL 
 
Abstract: 
 
Subsea gas compression system (SGCS) is a new critical subsea-to-shore field development solution that 
could reduce costs and environmental footprint. However, this system is not without inherent and 
operational risks. It is therefore, vital to evaluate the possible risks associated with SGCS to ensure the safe 
operation of the system. To this end, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a suitable method for the 
estimation of possible risks. However, the failure rate data from SGCS required for LOPA is sparse and 
mostly developed from experimental testing. Bayesian (BL) logic is an effective tool that could be used to 
resolve this shortfall. In this paper, generic data from a secondary database was updated with SGCS specific 
data using BL logic to give a better risk frequency value. The key findings show that the posterior values 
derived from the BL-LOPA methodology are safer and more reliable to implement for an event scenario 
when compared to literature, expert judgement and generic data; therefore recommending an improved 
judgement in the application of safety instrumented systems for a required safety integrity level. The case 
studies used demonstrated that the BL-LOPA risk assessment method is sufficiently robust for quantifying 
uncertainties in new process facilities with sparse data. 
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Nomenclature 
 
BL Bayesian Logic 
CCF  Common cause failure 
CCPS  Centre for Chemical Process Safety 
CM         Conditional modifiers 
CPT         Conditional Probability Table 
DAG        Directed Acyclic Graph 
DNV-RP Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd 
EC            Enabling Conditions  
EIReDA  European Industry Reliability Data Bank 
ESReDA European Safety and Reliability Research and Development Association 
ESDV  Emergency shutdown valve 
ETA         Event Tree Analysis 
FMEA  Failure mode and effect analysis 
FTA         Fault Tree Analysis  
HAZOP  Hazard and Operability Study 
IE             Initiating Event 
IEC          International Electro-Technical Commission 
IPL  Independent protection layer 
LOPA  Layer of protection analysis 
MTBF  Mean time between failures 
OREDA  Offshore reliability data 
PAH  Pressure alarm 
PCB  Pressure control valve 
PFD  Probability of failure on demand 
PHA        Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
SGCS  Subsea gas compression system 
SIF  Safety instrumented function 
SIL  Safety integrity level 
SIS  Safety instrumented system 
A           An event A 
A’          A not happening 
B           An event B 
E           An event E 
n           Number of demands 
t            Time 
     𝛼            Beta distribution 
𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟    Non-informative prior 
    𝜇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡      Posterior distribution mean 
    𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟     Gamma distribution 
    p          Point of estimate 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The repercussions of recent oil and gas industrial accidents (for example Macondo) has brought various 
stakeholders back to the drawing board in order to limit the reoccurrence of such major events in the near 
future. Most of the current focus is on the drilling sector. In the near future, subsea systems will be brought 
under the scrutiny of both the public and regulators for review under any of the process safety and 
resource management service institutions [1]. Most exploration and production companies that deal with 
subsea operations and legislative bodies have effectively the required standards on what systems and 
strategies must be put in place to ensure effective risk management [2]. These standards in themselves 
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however are insufficient to control and minimise risks and can be considered only as part of the integrity 
management lifecycle [3]. Subsea systems which are comprised mainly of flow-lines, production risers and 
subsea trees etc. located on the seabed will become an obvious target for redundancy requirements, fail-
safe or reliability demands, similar to those obtainable in other industrial processes.  
The issues of fines and penalties for failure will also come into play as a measure to ensure subsea systems 
are protected. Technically, the subsea gas compression system (SGCS) component in this paper is mainly 
considered as a critical unit operation in subsea systems.  While this is the case, the same principles of risk 
management can be replicated for any unit operation found in a subsea system. This technique is highly 
efficient because it generally pushes the gas rather than sucks it up to the surface [4]. Substantial efforts 
are made during the construction phase of the SGCS. It goes through various stages from qualification 
down to operational, which comprises the assessing and determination of the environmental conditions 
(deep sea) that will later become the work environment of the installed SGCS [5]. The elementary variables 
included are the conditions of the top of the seabed, the sea surface current, wave impacts, the 
composition of the seabed soil settings, the topography, geographic location and firmness, etc.  Other 
elements such as the type of fluid, the selection of materials, the mitigation of corrosion, interaction from 
third parties, design and life etc. are all areas that can be examined for risk assessment.  
 
According to Bai and Bai [6], risk assessment is a significant part of project management in industrial fields. 
It helps in the identification of risks in the operating process of a system.  Reliability risk analysis must be 
applied throughout the various sections of a system operation process. The quantification of a system’s 
probability of failures and the consequent effects of such failures are conveyed under risk assessments. 
This makes the analysis of failure modes and mechanisms a necessary procedure, particularly at the 
commencement of a process design when actions can easily be corrected and implemented. The analysis of 
failure came about due to the need to troubleshoot and also the need to solve reactive problems. In the 
international community, there are various techniques and methodologies used for risk assessment 
including: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Cause-
Consequences Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Relative Ranking, Checklists, Safety 
Review, What-If Analysis, Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
[7]. The purpose of these techniques is to ascertain and prevent design or process malfunctions, to ensure 
the reliability of the process lifecycle duration and the general protection of the process to avoid hazards 
while in operation. 
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1.1. Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
 
LOPA is a risk management technique commonly used in the chemical process industry that can provide a 
more detailed, semi-quantitative assessment of the risks and layers of protection associated with hazard 
scenarios [8, 9].  The LOPA method enables users to determine risks associated with hazardous events 
through the severity and the likelihood of such events occurring. With the aid of cooperative or 
international risk standards, LOPA users can ascertain the maximum amount of risk reduction necessary 
through analysing the various layers of protection [10]. If an additional risk reduction layer is required in 
addition to that given by the system design, other actions are taken into consideration, namely the basic 
process control system, pressure relief valves, alarms and related operator actions among others. This 
could then require a safety instrumented function (SIF) or safety instrumented system (SIS). The safety 
integrity level (SIL) of the safety instrumented function can be ascertained directly from the additional risk 
reduction required [11]. Jin et al. (2016) [12] discussed the theoretical basis of quantification for LOPA by 
comparing the computing methods of event tree consequences. The values obtained from LOPA can then 
be recorded as variables which can be computed for a Bayesian network, thereby critically analysing LOPA’s 
limitations.  
 
1.2. Bayesian Logic (BL) 
Bayesian logic is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) defined by a set of nodes and sets of directed arcs. The 
nodes denote the variables of a process and the arcs denote the dependencies or the cause and effect 
associations between them [13]. Each node state is related to probabilities. The probability is measured 
through deductive reasoning for a parent/root node which is then computed into the BL by inference for 
other sub nodes. Each sub node has a supplementary probability table named the conditional probability 
table (CPT) [14]. The computation of the logic is conducted via the Bayes theorem which states that if Pr(E) 
is the probability of E happening, then P (A/E) is the probability of A happening given that E has happened, 
given that Pr(E) is not equal to zero. The most common form of Bayes equation is 
 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐸) =
𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃𝑟(𝐸)
                                              (1) 
 
where  
 
 P(E) = P(E|A) × 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐸|𝐴′) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴′)                 (2) 
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A’ = A not happening 
The right-hand side of Equation 1 denotes the initial condition. After it is computed, the left-hand side 
known as the posterior values will be given [15].  The value of P(A) is the initial probability and Pr(E|A) is 
the likelihood function, which is a data specific situation. Pr(E) is the probability of E which is calculated 
from equation 2. This paper provides research into the process hazard analysis of a subsea gas compression 
system by modelling the estimated risk levels to be acquired over a period. The data obtained is updated 
using Bayesian logic. The derived values are then used to model an event scenario with independent 
protection layers including common cause failure and any other uncertainties in a subsea gas compression 
system. The results from the model are analysed using LOPA. This use of Bayesian-LOPA methodology for 
the risk estimation of subsea gas compression systems with limited and sparse operational data is new. The 
main aim of this paper therefore is to demonstrate the robustness of the Bayesian-LOPA risk assessment 
methodology in quantifying uncertainties in new subsea gas compression systems.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Failure Frequency Data Sources 
 
Bayesian logic requires the availability of failure frequency data, generic and SGCS (likelihood) data. This 
paper uses data from various sources ranging from historical data for SGCS components from organisations 
or research papers, to commercial and governmental handbooks of failure rate data. Brief explanations of 
these sources are given in Table 1 below: 
 
2.2 SGCS Case Study 
This paper concentrates on the typical design development type for subsea gas compression. The world’s 
first SGCS (Asgard SGCS) unit operation specifications will be used as a case study for the development of 
the event scenarios operation. In September 2015, Asgard SGCS (Aker Solutions) became the first SGCS to 
commence operation. The components and design specifications are shown in Table 2. Three case 
scenarios were used (see Table 7).  Case 1 deals with a human error initiating event with no prior 
information given, case 2 deals with an external initiating event with the prior information given, case 3 
deals with equipment failure while case 4 is a combination of the initiating events and IPLs of the three 
case scenarios earlier described. 
 
 
 
2.3 Bayesian Logic Evaluations 
2.3.1 Bayesian Logic Evaluation for Initiating Events 
Initiating event frequencies are estimated using BL. The conjugate prior distribution is used as the gamma 
distribution and the likelihood function is the Poisson distribution. The conjugate model of gamma 
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distribution is used to obtain the posterior data of failure frequency. The posterior distribution uses OREDA 
data obtained from gamma distribution. SGCS failure frequencies derived from previous database of mainly 
topside facilities are used as likelihood functions in the Poisson distribution. Bayesian logic estimates the 
newly developed posterior failure frequencies of initiating events. This is the concept behind generating 
conjugate distribution values based on Bayesian estimation. Where values differ in the Bayesian estimate 
of the gamma distribution formula as in the case of OREDA, Equation 3 can be rewritten as equation 2 to 
adapt the OREDA database gamma distribution. 
 
𝑓(𝜆) =
𝛽𝛼
Γ(𝛼)
𝜆𝛼−1ℯ−𝜆𝛽                                                          (3) 
 
𝑓(𝜆) =
1
𝛾𝛼Γ(𝛼)
𝜆𝛼−1ℯ
−
𝜆
𝛾 =
(
1
𝛾)
𝛼
Γ(𝛼)
𝜆𝛼−1ℯ
−(
1
𝛾
)𝜆
                 (4) 
 
Examining equations 3 and equation 4, a variance is observed in a parameter which has the relation 
 
𝛽 =
1
γ
                                                                                           (5) 
 
With the substitution of equation 5, a new equation of posterior values emerges as 
 
𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑥 + 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 , 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 = 𝑡 + 1 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟       (6)⁄  
 
Where the posterior distribution mean frequency is:  
 
𝜇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
=
𝑥 + 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
=
𝑥 + 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑡 + 1 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟⁄
                   (7) 
 
 
In occasions where there is little or no generic data for some devices, the Jeffrey’s non-informative prior is 
used. The Jeffrey’s non-informative prior and posterior means are represented by Equation 8 and 9 
respectively. 
 
𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑥 + 0.5, 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑡                                  (8) 
 
𝜇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
=
𝑥 + 0.5
𝑡
                                              (9) 
 
 
2.3.2 Bayesian Logic Evaluation for independent protection layers (IPLs)  
 
PFDs of IPLs are estimated using BL. For the conjugate prior, beta distribution is used while the likelihood 
function uses the binomial distribution. The conjugate concept is used to obtain the PFD posterior data via 
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binomial distribution. The data obtained from the various databases is directly used for PFD beta 
distribution [27]. The frequency PFD conversion method is used where the values of α and β of PFD are 
missing for some devices in a database. For example, OREDA and SGCS data failure frequencies are used 
where available as the likelihood function of binomial distribution. Conversely, if the number of demands 
for SGCS failure frequency is unavailable, an estimated correlation is made using the PFD estimating and 
point estimate equations. When this is achieved, the new IPL posterior PFD is estimated by Bayesian logic 
via beta distribution. Assuming that the period starting time 𝑡 is not dependent on the probability and that 
during standby periods system failures are independent of each other, then the probability of a system 
failure observed at time 𝑡 is:  
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡                                                         (10) 
 
The failure frequency is 𝜆 [28]. For a failure occurring during an assumed periodic device test, the PFD can 
be approximately estimated when detected during the test by:  
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 =
𝜆𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
2
                                                         (11) 
 
The test interval is 𝜆𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡. A table showing the test intervals of some devices is generated and used in case 
scenarios as required.  As explained in section 2.5.4 above, the point estimate 𝑝 is used for the frequency 
estimates. 
 
𝑝 =  𝑥 𝑛⁄                                                               (12) 
 
The mean time interval between two failures (MTBF) when 𝜆 is assumed to be constant is [29]:  
 
 
 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 =
1
𝜆
                                                   (13)  
 
If the values of equation 11 and 12 are assumed to be the same then the correlation of equations 11, 12 
and 13 gives the number of demands equation as:  
 
𝑛 =  
2𝑥
𝜆𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
=
2𝑥𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
                                (14) 
 
Using Equation 14 above, the number of failures, the number of demands, the test interval and the MTBF 
of an operation is estimated. Therefore, the PFD posterior mean can be calculated with the equation. 
When a database does not give the failure frequency data for some devices, OREDA is used. The necessary 
conversion of the frequency into PFD is due to OREDA being in gamma distribution. This needs to be 
adapted for beta distribution. Occurrences ranging from 0 to 1 can be modelled by beta distribution due to 
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its flexibility [30, 31]. If the probability range is from 0 to 1, then it can be assumed that the PFD intervals 
are in line with the beta distribution. This means that the mean, upper and lower % of credible interval PFD 
values follow the beta distribution. α and β are the two values of beta distribution and the mean value is 
given by equation 15. 
 
𝜇 =
𝛼
𝛼 +  𝛽
                                                 (15) 
 
Making β the subject equation, 16 is obtained  
 
𝛽 =
𝛼(1 − 𝜇)
𝜇
                                              (16) 
 
Describing 𝛼 and 𝜇 with the three factors consisting of the 5% credible lower PFD value, 𝛼 and 𝛽 values, 
then the value of 𝛼 is:  
 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐿 , 𝛼, 𝛼(1 − 𝜇) 𝜇) − 0.05 = 0⁄              (17) 
 
Betadist is the cumulative beta probability density function. The unknown variable in the equation 17 
above is 𝛼 and a Microsoft Excel spread sheet is used to obtain the value. The value of 𝛽 in equation 16 
above is found after obtaining the value of 𝛼 and 𝜇. These values are used for the prior information of beta 
distribution in Bayesian logic. The steps taken for the posterior distribution and likelihood function 
evaluation by Bayesian logic is observed in the same way as the other database prior distribution. The use 
of Jeffrey’s non-informative prior distribution is used when there is little or no information from the prior 
distribution or generic data of a given device [32]. The relationship between beta distribution and Jeffrey’s 
non-informative prior 𝛼 and 𝛽 = 0.5 therefore the following equations are used. 
 
𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑥 + 0.5, 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑛 − 𝑥 + 0.5              (18) 
 
𝜇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
=
𝑥 + 0.5
𝑛 + 1
                              (19) 
 
Other steps remain constant for situations in which there is informative prior. 
 
 
2.4 Common Cause Failure Effects for Multiple Devices 
 
The failure of a device or the occurrence of an event which causes the failure of an entire system is known 
as common cause failure (CCF) [33, 34]. There are different ways of modelling CCFs which can be classified 
under two methods, namely explicit and implicit. The explicit method is used when the dependency failure 
causes are known, for example environmental events or human error etc. This involves the addition of a 
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dependency cause value into a given analysis [35]. According to Hauge et al. [36], dependent failure causes 
are in most cases difficult or impossible to determine through the explicit method. Therefore, the implicit 
method is used for dependency failure causes. Examples of the implicit method are multiple Greek letters 
and the alpha and beta factor. The latter has gained wide acceptance in the process industry and is used to 
calculate the PFD effect of CCF [23]. Process industries install multiple devices to reduce the frequency or 
probability of failure. Two methods used in the process industry include the ‘one out of two devices works’ 
(1002) and the ‘two out of three devices work’ (2003). 
 
Method one’s PFD average is 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 = (𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)
2 + (
𝛽𝜆𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
2
+  𝛽𝜆𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅)            (20) 
 
Assuming 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 ⋘ 𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡, then (
𝛽𝜆𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
2
+  𝛽𝜆𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅) = 0, this is realistic because repair time is a lot less 
than the test interval, therefore equation 20 can be rewritten as:  
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 = (𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)
2 + (
𝛽𝜆𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
2
)  = (𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)
2 + 𝛽(𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)       (21) 
 
𝛽(𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1) is the effect of Common Cause Failure 𝛽 derived from expert judgement. 
Method two’s PFD average is:  
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 = 3(𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)
2 + (
𝛽𝜆𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
2
) = 3(𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)
2 +  𝛽(𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)      (22) 
 
2.5 Bayesian-LOPA Work Sheet and SIL Determination 
 
The Initiating events and PFDs of IPLs are obtained from the various database sources described above in 
section 2.1. For a particular event scenario, a customised database table is prepared and referenced where 
appropriate. The values for each event scenario developed from the customised tables are input into the 
Microsoft Excel spread sheet. The values for the frequency of an event scenario (prior, likelihood and 
posterior) are generated automatically as the required data is keyed into a Microsoft Excel spread sheet. 
The mitigated consequence from Bayesian logic is solved with equation 23 and 24 and written in a LOPA 
work sheet, then compared with the tolerable risk criteria [37]. Mitigated consequences without SIS are 
derived by adding the initiating events to the various IPLs for a particular event scenario using equations 25 
and 26 for SIL determination. The SIL is derived using equation 27 below and the result is compared with 
Table 3 below to obtain both their level of risk and the risk reduction required. Each level of risk in Table 3 
is obtained within a range of values of system integrity levels (SIL). If the SIL is not up to the tolerable risk 
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criteria, another instrumented system is added to it until an appropriate SIL is achieved. Generally, the 
higher the SIL the more expensive is the system. Figure 1 below shows a summary of the above 
methodology. Table 4 below shows the tolerable frequencies given to each category which encompasses 
human, environmental and process system safety. Values vary from country to country and depending on 
the nature of the loss, various industries provide average criteria to be used for their calculations and the 
value range of 1.0 × 10−3 to 1.0 × 10−5, a guideline by CCPS, is used. In this paper however, the tolerable 
frequency used is 1.0 × 10−5. This is more suitable for a process system and its environment, as it is 
completely automated and operates in the sea. The target frequencies are for single scenarios with 
multiple initiators. Figure 1 describes the flow diagram of this research work adapted from Yun [31]. 
mitigated consequence = 𝐼𝐸 × ∏ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
                              (23) 
mitigated consequence = 𝐼𝐸 × 𝐸𝐶 × 𝐶𝑀 × ∏ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑗         (24)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
mitigated consequence without SIS = 𝐼𝐸 + ∑ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
         (25) 
mitigated consequence without SIS = 𝐼𝐸 × 𝐸𝐶 × 𝐶𝑀 + ∑ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
     (26) 
SIL =
𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝑆)
                     (27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Results and Discussions 
  
3.1 Event Scenario Development 
 
Three event scenarios are developed and analysed, then their worst consequences are considered. The 
refining of the PFDs for the IEs and IPLs with BL then produces a new LOPA sheet with recommendations 
made by the addition of a new SIS if the IPLs do not reach the SIL [31, 39]. Case 1 and Case 2 event 
scenarios use the same unit operation, namely a separator; but Case 1 is assumed to have prior 
information with the initiating event being that of an external influence while Case 2 is assumed to have no 
prior information with the initiating event being that of human error.  Case 3 considers a different unit 
operation, in this case a multiphase pump and the initiating event is assumed to be caused by equipment 
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failure. These three scenarios therefore cover the three major causes of an incident in the operating 
process of a system and consider the SIL for the initiating event, before implementing the IPLs. Case 4 on 
the other hand provides a combination of initiating events and some IPLs of the three event scenarios to 
show the effects of CCF and other external conditions. The progression in Case 4 is shown through a LOPA 
event tree. The values used are drawn from the customised table shown below. Figure 2 below shows the 
gas liquid separator 
 
 
3.2 Customised Tables 
Keyword similarities between FEMA and HAZOP mapped into LOPA are as follows: Guideword or severity, 
Layers of Protections or risk reducing measure, deviation or failure mode. These are shown in Table 5 
below while only the causes and consequences are given in table 6, thereby mapping the critical 
information from HAZOP into LOPA.  
 
 
 
 
3.3 Case 1 
 
The following event scenario is assumed to be high risk, as overpressure of the separator leads to a loss of 
containment into the marine environment, causing pollution. The increase in the separator’s pressure is 
due to a pressure surge from the reservoir detailed in the customised Table 5. Tables 7 and 8 show the 
values used in the calculations. The considered IPLs are pressure alarm (PAH), pressure control valve (PCV) 
and an emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) termed IPL1, IPL2 and IPL3 respectively. Figure 2 above provides 
an overview of the IPLs and where they are positioned. The initiating event frequency can be attained from 
OREDA and a subsea database. After inputting the prior and likelihood values into the Excel sheet, the 
posterior value from the Bayesian logic calculation was solved to be 6.7 × 10−2. Figure 3a shows the 
posterior value to be between the prior and likelihood values.  
 
 
 
IPL1 is estimated using Bayesian logic and the calculated PFD is 2.4 × 10−1. From Figure 3b, it is observed 
that the posterior value is greater than the prior and likelihood values, thus showing that the values from 
the database were updated. The failure frequency was provided by OREDA giving the upper, lower and 
standard deviation values. These were converted with the PFD converter to find the alpha and beta values. 
IPL 2 gave a value of 5.0 × 10−4 as shown in Figure 3c and the prior and likelihood values were acquired 
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from EIReDA and CCPS. They had alpha and beta values and needed no conversion. IPL3 gave a posterior 
value of 5.8 × 10−3 as shown in Figure 3d and the prior and likelihood values were acquired from EIReDA 
and CCPS. Again, they had alpha and beta values and needed no conversion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering the event scenario described above, the mitigated frequency is the product of all the posterior 
values of the initiating event and the three IPLs. This gives: 
 
mitigated consequence = 6.7 × 10−2 × 2.4 × 10−1 × 5.0 × 10−4 ×  5.8 × 10−3 
= 4.5 × 10−8 
 
mitigated consequence without SIS = 6.7 × 10−2 + 2.4 × 10−1 + 5.0 × 10−4 +  5.8 × 10−3 
= 3.1 × 10−1 
 
SIL =
1.0×10−5
3.1×10−1
 =  3.2 × 10−5 
 
From Table 3 it can be seen that the mitigated consequence is lesser than the tolerable risk criteria, while 
the value calculated from the SIL calculation above shows there is no need to consider a new SIS because 
the mitigated consequence value shows that the risk has been reduced. The mitigated frequency of Case 1 
is evaluated with a LOPA sheet shown in Table 9 below. 
 
 
3.4 Case 2 
 
The event scenario is assumed to be high risk as overpressure of the separator leads to a loss of 
containment into the marine environment causing pollution. This is similar to Case 1 except that human 
error is considered as the initiating event. The operator is assumed to ignore the increase in pressure in the 
separator thereby failing to alert the system to balance out the threat by activating an IPL (e.g. pressure 
alarm). Tables 7 and 8 show the values used in the Excel calculations. The likelihood value for human error 
is based on both expert judgement and CCPS. The considered IPLs also remain the same as in Case 1. The 
initiating event frequency for human error is calculated with the Jeffery’s non-informative prior due to a 
lack of prior information from the generic database as described in section 2.5.4. Therefore, only likelihood 
and posterior values were obtained in the Excel worksheet. The posterior value from the Bayesian logic 
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calculation was solved to be 5.0 × 10−2. Figure 4 shows the updated Bayesian logic posterior value 
compared to the likelihood value per year. The values of the IPLs remain the same as those in Case 1. 
Considering the case scenario described above, the mitigated consequence is the product of all the 
posterior values of the initiating event and the three IPLs. This gives:  
 
mitigated consequence = 5.0 × 10−2 × 2.4 × 10−1 × 5.0 × 10−4 ×  5.8 × 10−3 
= 3.4 × 10−8 
 
mitigated consequence without SIS = 5.0 × 10−2 + 2.4 × 10−1 + 5.0 × 10−4 +  5.8 × 10−3 
= 3.0 × 10−1 
 
SIL =
1.0 × 10−5
3.0 × 10−1
 
=  3.3 × 10−5 
 
Again, the mitigated consequence is lesser than the tolerable risk criteria, while the value acquired from 
the SIL calculation above shows there is no need to consider a new SIS because the mitigated consequence 
value shows that the risk has been reduced. The mitigated frequency of Case 2 is evaluated with a LOPA 
sheet shown in Table 10 below. 
 
 
3.5 Case 3 
 
The event scenario is assumed to be of high risk in that equipment failure of a multiphase pump causes 
damage to the SGCS leading to increased maintenance costs. The customised Tables 7 and 8 show the 
values used in the Excel calculations. The considered IPLs are as follows: a detector and an alarm  (IPL1), a 
backup pump  (IPL2) and an emergency shutdown valve (ESDV)  (IPL3). The initiating event frequency is 
obtained from OREDA and the subsea data likelihood was obtained from Dash (2012). After inputting the 
prior and likelihood values into the Excel sheet, the posterior value from the Bayesian logic calculation was 
solved to be 3.8 × 10−1. Figure 5a below shows the posterior value to be in between the prior and 
likelihood values. The calculated posterior values for the detector and backup pump are 3.0 × 10−4 
respectively. 
 
IPL1 consists of a level detector and an alarm. The calculated posterior value for the detector from the 
excel spread sheet is 6.4 × 10−2 Figure 5b below shows the posterior value of the level detector compared 
to the prior and likelihood values. If it is assumed that the level detector and the alarm are independent of 
each other, thus the Boolean equation below can be used to find the PFD of IPL1. 
 
Pr(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) = Pr(𝐴) + Pr(𝐵) − Pr (𝐴) × Pr (𝐵) 
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Where Pr(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) is the PFD of IPL1, Pr(A) is the PFD of the level detector and Pr(B) is the PFD of the alarm, 
using the PFD posterior value 2.4 × 10−2 of the alarm in Case 1; therefore:  
 
IPL1 = Pr(0.0635 + 0.2349) − Pr(0.0635 ×  0.2349) 
𝐼𝑃𝐿1 = 2.8 × 10−1 
 
 
 
IPL2, which is the backup pump, gave a posterior value of 3.0 × 10−4 as shown in Figure 5d below. The 
prior and likelihood values were derived from EIReDA and Dash’s research respectively. It had alpha and 
beta values and needed no conversion. IPL3 is the emergency shutdown valve. The PFD posterior value 
5.8 × 10−3 of Case 1 is used. Considering the case scenario described above, the mitigated consequences 
are the product of all the PFD posterior values of the initiating event and the three IPLs. This gives:  
 
mitigated consequence = 3.8 × 10−1 × 2.8 × 10−1 × 3.0 × 10−4 ×  5.8 × 10−3 
= 1.9 × 10−7 
 
mitigated consequence without SIS = 3.8 × 10−1 + 2.8 × 10−1 + 3.0 × 10−4 +  5.8 × 10−3 
= 6.7 × 10−1 
 
SIL =
1.0 × 10−5
6.7 × 10−1
 
=  1.5 × 10−5 
 
The mitigated consequence is less than the tolerable risk criteria. Looking at Table 5, the mitigated 
consequence value shows that the risk has been reduced. However, the value derived from the SIL 
calculation above shows there is a need to consider a new SIS because the SIL value falls under category 4 
in Table 5. The mitigated consequence of Case 3 is evaluated with a LOPA sheet shown in Table 11 below. 
 
 
3.6 Case 4 
 
This event scenario is intended to explain the implications of modifying an initiating event by including 
enabling conditions (EC), conditional modifiers (CM) and also the effects of common cause failure (CCF) 
using method one, as explained in section 3.5. Figure 6 shows a LOPA event diagram illustrating the event 
procedure. The initiating events of Cases 1, 2 and 3 are the respective values of IE, EC, and CM while the 
considered IPLs are as follows. IPL1 consists of two high level alarms, if they are connected to the same 
system procedure. The CCF of the IPL therefore is found by assuming that the beta factor is 5% from expert 
judgements while the PFD of the alarm in Case 1 is used as 𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1 to get 𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2. IPL2 is the operator 
response and is assumed to be perfect, so the PFD value is 1. IPL3 is assumed to be the ESDV with the value 
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of 5.8 × 10−3, thus the PFD value for IPL1 will be:  
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 = (𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1)
2 + 𝛽(𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜1) 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 = (2.4 × 10
−1)2 + 0.05(2.4 × 10−1) 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 = 0.0576 + 0.012 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷1𝑜𝑜2 = 6.7 × 10
−2 
∴   𝐼𝐸 =  6.7 × 10−2 , 𝐸𝐶 = 3.8 × 10−2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑀 = 5.0 × 10−2 .  
mitigated consequence = 𝐼𝐸 × 𝐸𝐶 × 𝐶𝑀 × ∏ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
mitigated consequence = 6.7 × 10−2 ∙  3.8 × 10−2 ∙  5.0 × 10−2 ∙  6.7 × 10−2  ∙ 1.0 ∙  5.8 × 10−3 
=  4.9 × 10−8 
 
Therefore, the mitigated consequence is lesser than the tolerable risk criteria, as seen in Table 5. With 
respect to the implementation of a SIS, it is assumed that the system has failed although the IPLs all 
functioned properly. If this is the case, the PFDs of the three IPLs have the value of 1, thus: 
 
mitigated consequence without SIS = (6.7 × 10−2 ∙ 3.8 × 10−2 ∙ 5.0 × 10−2) 
= 2.7 × 10−4 
 
SIL =
1.0 × 10−5
2.7 × 10−4
 
=  3.7 × 10−2 
 
The value derived from the SIL calculation above shows that there is a need to consider a new SIS to reduce 
the risk because the SIL value falls under category 2 in Table 5. 
 
 
3.7    Results Validation and Limitations 
 
The posterior values are derived using Bayesian logic. For solving likelihood and prior information, the 
posterior data should be in-between the likelihood and prior information for the event scenarios where 
there is informative prior. A good example is figure 5c of Case 3 which shows that the frequency of pump 
failure was successfully updated with Bayesian logic. From the calculations, some of the posterior values 
did not meet this criterion. This means that either obsolete data was used or the likelihood information, 
which should be from a SGCS, was not accurate. This is so because SGCS is a new technology whereby the 
only data that can be obtained are experimental and not from long term operations due to its novelty. 
Nonetheless, the use of other plant and research information related to the SGCS is a welcome step in 
reducing uncertainties and also helps in modelling values for risk assessments. On this basis, a verdict can 
be given in favour of the approach taken if more reliable data could be accessible. However, the validity is 
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not always true for the final PFD values of an event scenario evaluated with LOPA. The values are either 
obtained by multiplying the initiating event with the IPLs or by adding the Initiating event to the IPLs if it 
can be proven that the IPLs’ PFDs values are gained without a SIS.  The equations 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 in 
section 3 were used to explain this. In some cases, expert judgement had to be used. To achieve the 
requirement of LOPA for an IPL, Boolean algebra was introduced for protection layers that might not reach 
these requirements but whether this strengthened or weakened the values obtained is beyond the scope 
of this paper. There was difficulty in modelling an event which would have required a SIL implementation 
due to sparse data with regard to SGCS, as previously discussed in section 2. The unit operations were 
assumed to function throughout the entire operating time of the Asgard SGCS [41]. This may have caused 
some discrepancies in the values of the PFDs. Generally, the experience of a process industry is vital in the 
completion and successful application of LOPA. 
 
4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
Table 12 shows the summary and recommendations for the event scenarios examined, given the risk 
reduction obtained by subtracting the event scenario initiating frequency from the value of the mitigated 
consequence. Table 13 shows the key findings of this paper, the comparison of posterior values to the prior 
and likelihood information. 
 
The use of Bayesian-LOPA methodology for SGCS risk evaluation in this paper was proven to be a useful 
method of analysing risks that may occur in SGCS operations. HAZOP study however is needed for the 
adequate application of the methodology. The HAZOP study helps to streamline the risks foregrounding 
those with potentially major consequences for the immediate environment and the system at large. The 
event scenarios that could lead to a major disaster were considered under LOPA by combining SGCS 
specific data and generic data as likelihood and prior information. 
 
Although LOPA is mainly used in chemical processes, SGCS is related to such a process due to the 
similarities of its unit operations. Therefore, the use of LOPA is justified. Failure data is crucial in the use of 
LOPA for the computation of risk frequencies. However, failure data from SGCS is limited due to its novelty 
and limited experimental data history.  This shortcoming is addressed through Bayesian logic due to its 
ability to update either SGCS data or data from a similar industry with generic data. In other words, 
Bayesian logic tends to give a refined solution for LOPA utilisation by striking a balance between short term 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
17 
 
and long term data. The results from applying this method to some events and scenarios gave an overview 
of the potential consequences of an initiating event with respect to the risk values. Recommendations for 
additional SIS to meet an appropriate SIL were provided. HAZOP information is vital for LOPA. Even through 
subsea operations mainly use HAZID and FMEA, it can be easily mapped into HAZOP. Initiating events, 
failure frequencies and IPLs’ PFDs were evaluated with Bayesian logic. The methodology gave the 
quantified risk results of the event scenarios which were made clearer with a LOPA event tree diagram. The 
outcomes were compared with the tolerable risk criteria given by CCPS as a benchmark. Further decisions 
were made to increase the SIS in order to meet the desired SIL after comparison in order to improve the 
safety procedures of SGCS and further research into its associated risks and risk reduction. 
 
Conjugate gamma distribution produced the values for initiating event frequencies used for prior 
information, while Poisson distribution produced the values for the likelihood function, both of which were 
balanced by Bayesian logic to produce posterior values. The OREDA database with gamma distribution 
values was used for the prior information. The Jeffery’s non-informative prior however can be used if there 
is no prior information. This was shown by the lack of information in one of the event scenarios. Data from 
available literature was used in the derivation of SGCS specific likelihood data. The IPLs’ PFDs were 
evaluated under binomial likelihood distribution and conjugate beta prior distribution.  The provision of 
failure frequency data in the beta distribution format made the use of the EIReDA database suitable for 
prior information. The frequency-PFD converter developed by Yun was used to generate failure frequency 
data where EIReDA did not give their values. The amalgamation of Bayesian logic and LOPA produces the 
Bayesian-LOPA methodology. The posterior values derived from the Bayesian-LOPA methodology are safer 
and more reliable to use in modelling an event scenario when compared to expert judgements, generic 
data, values from literature reviews and experimental data; in this case the likelihood and prior 
information. Thus, an improved judgement can be made in the application of a safety instrumented system 
(SIS) for a required safety integrity level (SIL). 
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Figure 1: Research flow diagram (Adapted from Yun [31]) 
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Figure 2: Gas-Liquid Separator showing Layers of Protection [38] 
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Fig.3: (a) Frequency of pressure increase updated with Bayesian logic, (b) Pressure alarm PFDs updated with Bayesian 
logic, (c) Pressure control valve PFDs updated with Bayesian logic, (d) Emergency shutdown valve PFDs updated 
with Bayesian logic 
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Fig.4: Frequency of human errors updated with Bayesian logic 
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Fig.5 (a): Frequency of pump failure updated with Bayesian logic, (b) Frequency of level detector updated with 
Bayesian logic and (c) Frequency of backup pump failure updated with Bayesian logic 
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Fig.6: LOPA event tree following the event of case 4 
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Table 1: Databases and associated industrial applications 
Database Source Application Remarks 
ESReDA/ 
EIReDA 
European Safety 
and Reliability 
Research and 
Development 
Association/ 
European Industry 
Reliability Data 
Bank 
Electricite de 
France 
The data offers, distribution values, average 
values of PFD and frequencies etc. α and β 
factors were provided for gamma 
distribution which was used for failure 
frequency. For PFD beta distribution α and β 
were also provided [16]. The database is 
used to generate data for prior distribution. 
DNV-GL 
 
(DNV-GL 
2015) 
Det Norske Veritas 
and Germanischer 
Lloyd 
Oil and gas 
sector 
Data collated from this organisation are 
focused on offshore classification, risk 
management; marine assurance etc. and its 
uses are referenced appropriately. [17, 18, 
19] 
OREDA The Offshore 
Reliability Data 
Offshore 
platform 
installations 
The values are used as part of the data for 
the prior distribution in the Bayesian 
estimation for PFDs of IPLs and initiating 
frequencies. [20] 
CCPS The Centre for 
Chemical Process 
Safety 
Reliability 
analysis of 
process 
equipment 
It gives the PFDs and values of lower, mean 
and upper failure frequencies [21, 22]. 
IEC 61508/ 
 IEC 61511 
International 
Electro-Technical 
Commission 
Safety integrity 
level (SIL) and 
probability of 
failure on 
demand (PFD) 
IEC provides PFDs values with regards to 
personnel safety hence the use of SIL instead 
of environmental integrity level (EIL) in the 
case of SGCS it is not differentiated [23, 24, 
25]. 
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Table 2: Asgard SGCS unit operation components and specifications [4, 26]  
Characteristics Value 
Design Life  30 Years 
Water Depth  250 – 325 m 
Design Gas Flow 25 MSm3/d 
Design pressure 210 bar 
Max LVF into compressor 0.46 
Number Trains  2 + 1 spare 
Compressor power 2 x 11.5 MW 
Structure Size 75 m x 45 m x 20 m 
Weight 4800 tons 
Compressor type  2 x integrated motor centrifugal 
compressor 
Number Pumps 2 x centrifugal pumps 
No of coolers 2 anti-surge + 2 passive coolers 
Separators Two-phase vertical separators X 2 
 
 
 
Table 3: Safety Integrity Level with tolerable risk criteria for Probability of Failure on Demand Average 
 
SIL PFDavg Reduced Risk 
1 ≥10-2 to 10-1 >10 to ≤ 100 
2 ≥10-3 to 10-2 >100 to ≤ 1000 
3 ≥10-4 to 10-3 >1000 to ≤ 10000 
4 ≥10-5 to 10-4 >10000 to ≤ 100000 
(Adapted from IEC [25]) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Category of consequences and tolerable frequencies 
 
Category Tolerable frequency 
Multiple fatalities of personnel 1*10-6 
The environment 1*10-4 
Facility (Assets) 1*10-4 
[Adapted from Unnikrishnan et al [38]] 
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Table 5: Customized table showing FMEA adapted for HAZOP in SGCS 
 
Event 
Scenario 
Guideword/ 
severity 
Process 
Parameter 
Deviation/ 
failure 
mode 
Failure Causes Consequences Layers of Protections/ risk 
reducing measure 
Gas Liquid 
Separator 
High/ Major Pressure Pressure 
exceeding 
design 
pressure 
External Influence from 
within the reservoir, 
Human errors operator 
fails to balance pressure 
Release of 
containment 
Alarm, operator’s response to 
initiate PCV, emergency 
shutdown procedure 
Multiphase 
Pump 
Severe/ 
critical 
Temperature Loss of 
head and 
pressure 
Pump failure SGSC damage which 
leads to high 
maintenance cost etc. 
Equipment failure detector and 
alarm, backup equipment, 
emergency shutdown procedure 
 
 
 
Table 6: Customized table showing LOPA event scenarios 
 
Event Scenario Nos. Causes Consequences Event Scenarios 
1 External influence Release of containment Case 1 
2 Operator’s error release of containment Case 2 
3 Device Failure SGCS damage Case 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Customized table showing initiating events frequencies 
 
Class Prior data Likelihood data 
Event Minimum Mean 
(per year) 
maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Note and 
References 
Operating 
years 
Number of 
failures 
Note and 
References 
Increase in 
pressure 
0 0.1 0 0.9985 OREDA 30 2 CCPS [21, 22] 
and Asgard 
SGCS [40] 
Human 
errors 
- - - - - 30 1 CCPS & Expert 
Judgement 
Pump 
failure 
0 2.50 3.90 3.2384 OREDA & DNV 6 1 Dash [41] 
 
 
 
Table 8: Customized table showing probability of failure on demand of IPLs  
Class Prior Data Likelihood data 
Event Alpha Beta Lower 
PFD 
Mean 
PFD 
Upper 
PFD 
Lower 
(/year) 
Mean 
(/year) 
Upper 
(/year) 
S.D. Reference
s 
Nos. 
of 
failur
e 
MTBF 
(year) 
Test 
Interva
l 
(year) 
References 
PAH - - - - - 1.73
× 10−4 
4.22
× 10−2 
1.62
× 10−1 
5.96
× 10−2 
OREDA  2 1.52
× 102  
0.0833 CCPS [21, 
22] 
& expert 
judgement 
PCV 2.90
× 101  
6.20
× 104  
3.00
× 10−4 
4.70
× 10−4 
6.00
× 10−4 
- - - - EIReDA  4 1.82
× 102  
2.0000 CCPS [21, 
22]   
ESDV 4.97
× 100  
4.29
× 103  
7.20
× 10−4 
1.16
× 10−3 
1.56
× 10−3 
- - - - EIReDA  20 3.03
× 101  
0.0833 CCPS [21, 
22] 
LAH - - - -  1.28
× 10−2 
4.02
× 10−2 
8.00
× 10−2 
2.11
× 10−2 
OREDA 
 
2 1.52
× 102  
0.0833 CCPS & 
Christophe
r [42] 
LP, 
HP 
pum
p 
8.80
× 100  
4.41
× 104  
1.10
× 10−4 
1.90
× 10−4 
2.70
× 10−4 
- - - - EIReDA  6 6.11
× 10−6 
0.0833 CCPS & 
Dash 
research 
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Table 9: Case 1 LOPA spread sheet 
 
 
  
Event scenario  Case 1 Posterior (Bayesian Logic) 
Date Description Probability Frequenc
y 
(/year) 
Consequence Description/ Category    
Risk Tolerance Criteria  
(Frequency) 
  > 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event (Frequency) Increase in pressure within the separator due to pressure surge 
from the reservoir 
  
6.70E-02 
Frequency of Unmitigated consequence   6.70E-02 
Independent Protection Layers Pressure Alarm (PAH) 2.40E-01  
Pressure control valve(PCV) 5.00E-04  
Emergency shutdown Valve (ESDV) 5.80E-03  
   
Total PFD for all IPLs  6.81E-07  
Frequency of Mitigated Consequence 
(/year) 
  4.50E-08 
Risk Tolerance Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES   
Actions Required to meet Risk Tolerance 
Criteria 
There should be 1-month test intervals for the pressure alarm. 
An independent logic solver should be put in place to give 
maximum credit points in case a particular IPL has two devices  
  
Notes    
References    
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Table 10: Case 2 LOPA spread sheet 
 
 
 
 
  
Event scenario Case 1 Posterior (Bayesian Logic) 
Date Description Probabilit
y 
Frequenc
y 
(/year) 
Consequence Description/ Category    
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
(Frequency) 
  > 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event (Frequency) Increase in pressure within the separator due to pressure surge 
from the reservoir 
  
6.70E-02 
Frequency of Unmitigated consequence   6.70E-02 
Independent Protection Layers Pressure Alarm (PAH) 2.40E-01  
Pressure control valve(PCV) 5.00E-04  
Emergency shutdown Valve (ESDV) 5.80E-03  
   
Total PFD for all IPLs  6.81E-07  
Frequency of Mitigated Consequence 
(/year) 
  4.50E-08 
Risk Tolerance Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES   
Actions Required to meet Risk Tolerance 
Criteria 
There should be 1-month test intervals for the pressure alarm. 
An independent logic solver should be put in place to give 
maximum credit points in case a particular IPL has two devices 
  
Notes    
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Table 11: Case 3 LOPA Spread Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Risk reduction summary of event scenarios 
 
Event scenario Failure frequency 
(/year) 
Criteria 
Met 
SIL nos. Risk reduction Recommendations 
Case 1 6.70E-02 YES - 0.0670 An independent logic solver should 
be put in place to give maximum 
credit points in case a particular IPL 
has two devices 
Case 2 5.00E-02 YES - 0.0410 There should be drills for operators 
to check their readiness for such an 
event scenario. 
Case 3 3.80E-01 YES - 0.3710 SIS for SIL 4 should be considered 
 
 
  
Event scenario  Case 3 Posterior (Bayesian Logic) 
Date Description Probability Frequenc
y 
(/year) 
Consequence Description/ Category    
Risk Tolerance Criteria  
(Frequency) 
  > 1.00E-3 
< 1.00E-5 
Initiating event (Frequency) Human errors operator fails to alert system to balance 
pressure 
  
3.80E-01 
Frequency of Unmitigated consequence   3.80E-01 
Independent Protection Layers Level Detector (LAH) 
Pressure Alarm (PAH) 
2.80E-01  
Backup Pump 3.00E-04  
Emergency shutdown Valve (ESDV) 5.80E-03  
Total PFD for all IPLs  4.93E-07  
Frequency of Mitigated Consequence 
(/year) 
  1.90E-07 
Risk Tolerance Criteria Met? (Yes/No) YES   
Actions Required to meet Risk Tolerance 
Criteria 
There should be drills for operators to check their readiness 
for such an event scenario. 
Detectors and alarms should be independent of operator’s 
in other to maintain risk value 
SIS for SIL 4 should be considered  
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Table 13: Comparison of Values 
 
 Prior Likelihood Posterior 
Case 1 IE 1.00E-1 6.67E-2 6.70E-2 
Case 1 IPL1 4.22E-2 3.00E-4 2.35E02 
Case 1 IPL2 4.70E-4 5.50E-3 5.00E-4 
Case 1 IPL3 1.16E-3 1.40E-3 5.80E-3 
Case 2 IE - 3.33E-2 5.00E-2 
Case 3 IE 2.50E+0 1.67E-1 3.83E-1 
Case 3 IPL1 4.02E-2 3.00E-4 6.35E-2 
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